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CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN HONG KONG -
ITS PROGRESS AND ITS FUTURE
0
Gary Meggitt*
The Civil Justice Reform process in Hong Kong began in February 2000 and
is expected to reach its culmination with new Rules of the High Court in April
2009. Nine long years therefore separate its beginning and end. This article
attempts to answer the questions "Why did the process begin?", "Where has it
led?" and "What will it mean for the courts, litigants and the legal profession?".
In doing so, the article considers the English Civil Procedure Rules, which form
the basis of many of the new Rules of the High Court in Hong Kong. In particular
it looks at the changes that may result from the introduction of the proposed
underlying objectives, sanctioned offers and the expanded scope of discovery.
Introduction
"The wheels of justice grind slowly, but ... when they do... they grind ex-
ceedingly fine". Readers will hopefully excuse this article beginning with
such an old chestnut - it is a very appropriate one when considering the
progress of Civil Justice Reform in Hong Kong.
The grind began in February 2000 when the Chief Justice appointed a
Working Party of distinguished Hong Kong lawyers and laymen2 to review
and recommend changes to the High Court's rules and procedures.' The
Working Party published an Interim Report and Consultation Paper ("the
Interim Report") in 2001, followed by a Final Report in 2004.
In 2006, a Steering Committee - of equally distinguished members -
published a further Consultation Paper and a set of draft amended Rules of
the High Court ("RHC"). The next turn of the wheel was in April 2007,
when the Civil Justice (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill 2007 ("the Bill")
Barrister at Law and Solicitor Advocate (England & Wales), Teaching Consultant, Faculty of Law,
and Fellow of the Asian Institute of International Financial Law University of Hong Kong.
1 One version of the actual quote is "Though the mills of God grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding
small; Though with patience He stands waiting, with exactness grinds He all" from "Retribution"
(Sinngedichte) by Friedrich, Freiherr von Logau (1604-1655) but it has been used and abused over
the centuries.
2 The Working Party's membership is listed at p 1, para 2 of the Interim Report and Consultative
Paper (IR).
Whilst this article focuses on the High Court, as did the Working Party and subsequent work, it
should be appreciated that the District Court's rules (RDC) will also be reformed.
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was introduced to the Legislative Council. In October 2007, the Steering
Committee published another Consultation Paper and draft RHC to take
into account the Legislative Council's work on the Bill. The Bill was en-
acted in February 20084 and a new version of the draft RHC appeared the
same month to reflect the responses to the earlier documents. The govern-
ment hopes that the "new" court rules will be in place by 2 April 2009.'
Civil Justice Reform in Hong Kong may, therefore, take over nine years
from start to finish. A slow grind indeed, especially when compared to re-
form in some of the other common law jurisdictions.' Yet why did it begin?
Where has it led? Most important of all, what will it mean for the courts,
litigants and the legal profession? In looking at these questions, this article
focuses on the practical aspects of reform, rather than the theoretical dis-
cussions that may - or may not - influence it.
Why? - The Interim Report
The Working Party's Task
The Civil Justice Reform Working Party was given the following terms of
reference upon its appointment:
"To review the civil rules and procedures of the High Court and to rec-
ommend changes thereto with a view to ensuring and improving access
to justice at reasonable cost and speed."'
From the outset, it was accepted that the civil justice system in Hong Kong
needed reform. The Interim Report, published on 21 November 2001,
quoted numerous judges, practitioners and academics bemoaning the state
of common law systems in general and the Hong Kong system in particular.
Mr Justice Litton, a former Permanent Judge of the Court of Final Appeal,
commented, "Civil litigation is in a crisis. It has been so for some time".8
The Interim Report also pointed to numerous earlier reports on the
problems of various common law jurisdictions.9 The Interim Report paid
As the Civil Justice (Miscellaneous Amendments) Ordinance 2008 ("the Ordinance").
Chief Justice's Speech at Ceremonial Opening of the Legal Year 2008, Department of Justice Press
Release, 14 January 2008.
Lord Woolf was appointed by the Lord Chancellor to review the English civil justice system in
March 1994. His Lordship's interim report appeared in June 1995, the final report was produced
the following year and the English Civil Procedure Rules came into force in April 1999.
Interim Report, p 1, para 1.
' Interim Report, p 15 para 37.1.
9 Interim Report, pp 5-14, s B. "Pressures felt by many civil justice systems".
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particular attention to Lord Woolf's "Access to Justice" reports,o which
ultimately led to the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules ("CPR")
in England and Wales in 1999. This focus on the CPR, when compared
to other reforms in other common law jurisdictions, has been maintained
throughout the Civil Justice Reform process.
The Working Party's Analysis
The Interim Report identified a number of ailments shared by common law
jurisdictions including Hong Kong. These include, in no particular order,
expense; delay; uncertainty; and "overly adversarial" practices. Further,
there is perceived a lack of equality between wealthy litigants and poorer
ones. In addition, the procedural rules are "incomprehensible" to many
members of the public. Finally, the courts are "fragmented' and no one has
"clear overall responsibility" for their administration." In addition to these
problems, Hong Kong suffers additional "pressures" caused by expense, de-
lay, complexity and unrepresented litigants.
Expense
The Working Party examined all High Court bills of cost taxed between 1
July 1999 and 30 June 2000.13 They discovered that many successful plain-
tiffs in smaller cases paid their legal advisers more in costs than what they
recovered from the defendants in damages." The costs in larger claims were
almost, but not quite, as disproportionate. It is felt that this discourages
people from pursuing their legitimate rights and also makes Hong Kong a
less attractive place in which to do business.
Delay
The Working Party also examined the courts' records to determine the ex-
tent and cause of procedural delays. 5 Litigants, their lawyers and the courts
themselves were all found to be at fault. Overrunning trials leading to the
postponement of subsequent hearings are just one of the many problems
that need urgent attention.
Complexity
The Interim Report praised the CPR for "jettisoning" Latin in favour of
"functional terms". For example "plaintiff' has been replaced with "claim-
ant" (although this article shall use the term "plaintiff' throughout). More
1o Interim Report, p 6, paras 16-17 and subsequently throughout both the Interim and Final Reports.
1 Interim Report, p 9, para 24.
12 Interim Report, pp 15-16, s C. "Pressures felt by the Hong Kong system".
1 Interim Report, pp 17-36, s D. "Expense and the Hong Kong Civil Justice System" and Interim
Report, Appendix A "Report on Survey of Litigation Costs".
1 Interim Report, pp 29-30, para 66.
15 Interim Report, pp 37-48, s E. "Delays and the Hong Kong Civil Justice System" and Appendix C.
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importantly, it identified the CPR's "overriding objective" to "deal with cas-
es justly" as crucial to cutting through unnecessary complexity and focusing
on what was important to the parties. 6
Litigants in person
The increasing number of unrepresented litigants" creates delays because
they do not know what to do or when or how to do it. Worse still, there are
unrepresented litigants who abuse the system by bringing unjustified claims.
An additional problem for Hong Kong is the pressure on the courts' bilin-
gual resources caused by such litigants.
The Working Party's Proposals
If these are the symptoms of the civil justice's illness, what is the diagnosis?
The Interim Report answered:
"The faults in the civil justice system are generally seen to be the prod-
uct of distortions caused by its adversarial design.""
The Interim Report described this faulty "adversarial design" as emphasis-
ing oral advocacy, with the parties "running" their cases whilst the courts
play a relatively passive role. This "design fault" is, in the Working Party's
opinion, exacerbated by both the growth in litigation, a decline in lawyers'
professional standards and a lack of judicial resources.19
In which case, why not change the design? Sadly, the Interim Report
did not broach this question. It makes no comparison of the adversarial
and inquisitorial approaches to civil litigation. It may have made for an
interesting and productive discussion among the bench, the legal profes-
sion and the wider public had it done so. Instead, the Interim Report, as
Lord Woolf's "Access to Justice" did, shied away from advocating anything
as dramatic as replacing the adversarial system with an inquisitorial system
along, say, the French lines." This is the first, but not the last, grind to a
halt in Civil Justice Reform.
Having said this, the Interim Report's suggested "treatment" of the ill-
ness was not timid and credit must be given for this. There were 80 separate
Proposals on a wide variety of subjects. These are summarised in Figure
1. The range of the Proposals serves to remind those who have read the
16 Interim Report, pp 51-53, paras 134-137.
17 Interim Report, pp 42-70, s G "Unrepresented Litigants" and Appendix C, Tables 17-21.
'8 Interim Report, p 10, para 26.
1 Interim Report, p 10, para 27.
z Interim Report, pp 11-14, paras 30-35.6.
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Interim Report - and to demonstrate to those who have not - just how
much change was anticipated.
Figure 1: Proposals in the Interim Report
* Adopt a CPR-style "overriding objective" and a "comprehensive
case management approach";
* Introduce pre-action protocols;
* Simplify the mode of starting proceedings;
* Streamline default judgments;
* Cut down on prolix pleadings;
* Introduce statements of truth in pleadings;
* Amend the test for summary judgment;
* Adopt CPR Part 36 on settlement offers and payments;
* Consolidate the rules on interim remedies such as Marevas;
* Introduce a docket system and increasing the number of
specialist lists;
* Reform the rules on multi-party claims;
* Introduce CPR style "disclosure" in place of discovery and
expand the scope of pre-action and non-party discovery;
* Reduce the time spent on interlocutory applications;
* Give the courts more control of lay and expert witnesses;
* Adopt a more court-centred approach to trials;
* Reform the rules on appeals, including a new requirement for
leave to appeal;
* Simplify the taxation of costs; and
* Introduce an element of compulsory mediation or other types of
ADR.
Implementing the Proposals
Just as important as "what" reforms to implement is "how" to implement
them. The essential choice, as the Working Party saw it, was between
adopting the CPR, subject to minor amendments (Proposal 74) and lim-
ited, specific amendments to the existing RHC (Proposal 75).21
There were believed to be several advantages to Proposal 74. The
drafting work, three years of it, had already been done in England. The
"plain English" of the CPR would reduce procedural complexity and could
be translated into Chinese with greater ease than an amended RHC.
There were several years of English court decisions, which had resolved
21 Interim Report, p 255-258, s M. "Implementing the Reforms".
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contentious and ambiguous points, to draw upon. Finally, a "Hong Kong
CPR" would represent a fresh start and an opportunity to change the whole
culture of dispute resolution in the territory.
In comparison, amending the RHC would involve a great deal of re-
drafting. This process would be complicated by the distinct styles of the
CPR and RHC, ruling out a "cut and paste" exercise. In addition, there
could be serious difficulties over the "boundaries" between any new rules,
especially on case management, and the "older" parts of the RHC which
,2
would only be resolved by "costly satellite litigation".
Without being too explicit, the Interim Report favoured Proposal 74
over Proposal 75. The grinding of the proverbial wheels thus resumed.
The Consultation
The consultation period for the Interim Report began following its publica-
tion on 21 November 20001 and ended on 30 April 2002.
The Working Party indicated that 5,000 printed copies and over 500
CD-ROMs of the Interim Report were distributed, together with 12,000
copies of the Executive Summary. The Working Party's website received
over 41,000 hits, with over 1,600 downloads of the entire Interim Report.23
The consultation period also saw various briefings and seminars, including
four local radio reports.
Almost 100 written submissions in response were received from organi-
sations and individuals, including the Law Society, Bar Association and
Consumer Council."
Where? - The Final Report to the Ordinance
The Working Party's Final Report was published on 3 March 2004. The ob-
ject of the Final Report, in the Working Party's own words, was:
"to identify the areas where reform is considered necessary or desirable
and to make recommendations to the Chief Justice accordingly."25
The Final Report contained 150 Recommendations, which focused on par-
ticular rule changes rather than general aspirations.
22 Interim Report, p 256, para 699.1.
Z Final Report, p 3 , para 5 and Appendix 1.
2 Final Report, Appendix 2.
z Final Report, p 3 , para 7.
26 Final Report, p 3 , para 8.
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From Proposals to Recommendations
Inevitably, not all of the 80 Proposals made it through to becoming Recom-
mendations. In particular, the introduction of pre-action protocols (except
for specialist lists) was dropped because of concerns that they would front-
load costs. Nor was there much support for introducing the CPR's "no
reasonable prospect of success" test for summary judgment in place of the
existing test. Tighter court controls on lay and expert witnesses also fell by
the wayside in light of the consultation. 7
There was, however, much more support for simplifying the commence-
ment of proceedings and for statements of truth in pleadings. In addition,
CPR Part 36 style settlement offers and payments received considerable
backing. Also, while the consultation revealed no enthusiasm for dropping
the Peruvian Guano28 test for discovery,29 there was support for expanding
the scope of pre-action and non-party discovery beyond personal injury
cases.
Implementation Revisited
The most telling consequence, however, of the consultation was the fate of
Proposal 74. As already stated, the Interim Report gave the impression that
the Working Party preferred adopting the CPR to amending the RHC. The
Final Report spends a great deal of text dismissing that impression by taking
the perceived benefits of adopting the CPR and proceeding to reject them.
Firstly, it is noted that the CPR's principal anticipated benefit of reduced
costs had not been enjoyed in England and Wales. The Final Report high-
lighted various surveys demonstrating that costs had not decreased since
1999.30
Also, it was alleged that the CPR had not reduced the complexity of
the civil justice system in England and Wales. Whilst its "plain English"
language was clearer, the CPR itself was becoming just as complex and cum-
bersome as the rules it had replaced. This process was fuelled, in part, by
satellite procedural litigation. In addition, although this is not mentioned
by the Final Report, there have - as of early 2008 - been 46 wide-ranging
CPR updates issued by the UK court service.
The Working Party also changed its mind about the amount of work
that would be needed to introduce the CPR compared to amending the
1 Ironically, the Legislative Council is now considering the introduction of a pre-action protocol.
Unfortunately, as at the time of writing, there is no draft. Also, the proposed RHC contain tighter
court controls on witnesses and experts.
' Compagnie Financiere du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Company (1882) 11 QBD 55.
'9 Final Report, p 243, para 472.
1 Final Report, p 9, para 16.
1 The 46th update, covering such diverse subjects as mesothelioma claims and the Companies
(Cross-border mergers) Regulations 2007 came into force in stages in early 2008.
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RHC. The Final Report implied that the Interim Report had, in particular,
underestimated how much retraining of the judiciary, court staff and the
profession would be called for. In addition, the "plain English" attractions
of the CPR were downplayed, and the ease of translating it into Chinese,
when there was already a "serviceable Chinese version" of the RHC, was
also doubted.
The Final Report concluded its debunking exercise with a rhetorical
question "One must therefore ask to what extent such additional cost would
be justified" by adopting the CPR.12 Its answer can be found in its decision:
"(a) to try, if possible, to avoid the pitfalls revealed by the CPR experi-
ence, for example, in respect of measures carrying front-loaded
costs;
(b) to try to form a realistic view of the benefits likely to be achievable
under local conditions; and
(c) to ask whether such benefits can be achieved with less effort than
by introduction of an entirely new code." 33
This required the adoption of Proposal 75. Among those reforms that could
be introduced with "less effort" were CPR Part 36 style settlement offers
and payments.
Given the opposition to Proposal 74 (including that of the Law Soci-
ety, the Bar Association and many High Court judges and masters) that
emerged during the consultation, the Working Party could be forgiven for
retreating from its original, albeit tentative, support for adopting the CPR.
Yet this sits uncomfortably with the Final Report's robust defence of Alter-
native Dispute Resolution (ADR) in the face of a seemingly equal amount
of opposition.
Once again, as with the sidestepping of the adversarial versus inquisi-
torial issue, one senses a slowing of the - already ponderous - wheels of
reform. There is much to be said for Caesar Augustus' policy of "Make haste
slowly" 34 but not when the faults in the status quo are so manifest.
Whilst it is true that costs in England have not been arrested by the in-
troduction of the CPR, that is no reason for dismissing it out of hand. The
engines of costs are numerous and powerful. The introduction of new legal
rights, such as those under the UK Human Rights Act 1998; a society of
"consumers" rather than "recipients" of public and private services; and a
legal profession that is forced - by market pressures - to behave more like a
32 Final Report, p 16, para 24.
13 Final Report, p 16, para 26.
14 Suetonius Div Aug 25.
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"business" than a "calling" are just three of these engines. One indisputable
success of the CPR has been to make such costs transparent - something
that is desperately needed in Hong Kong.
The criticism that the CPR has grown in complexity since its intro-
duction is similarly misguided. Are we to expect a legal system to remain
unchanged in the face of changes elsewhere in commerce and society?
Should it not be amended and added to when mistakes are discovered or
improvements designed? Can the CPR or RHC remain pickled in aspic?
To put it another way, the Final Report noted that one barristers' chambers
which opposed Proposal 74 spoke - with praise - of the way that the exist-
ing civil courts had "evolved over 150 years". With respect, evolution does
not involve the gentle metamorphosis of one creature into another over the
course of years; it involves the often abrupt replacement of the former with
the latter by the process of natural selection."
One could continue in this vein but, regrettably, the die is cast and any
further comments on yet another - perhaps the most jarring - halt in the
grind would serve little practical purpose. Instead, the article shall address
the shortcomings of the incremental change embodied by Proposal 75 when
dealing with some of the specific changes.
The Steering Committee and the Ordinance
On 19 March 2004, the Chief Justice announced his acceptance of the 150
Recommendations in the Final Report. At the same time, he established a
Steering Committee, to be chaired by Chief Judge of the High Court the
Hon. Mr Justice Ma, to focus on the amendments to primary and subsidiary
legislation that would be required to implement the Recommendations. It
eventually determined that 21 of them required amendments to primary
legislation, and a further 84 would necessitate amending subsidiary legisla-
tion.
On 12 April 2006, the Steering Committee published its own Consul-
tation Paper with, as annexes, a draft Bill; draft Rules of the High Court
(Amendment) Rules 2007; and (iii) draft High Court Fees (Amendment)
Rules 2007. The Steering Committee sought comments during a three-
month consultation period which ended on 12 July 2006. Following this
process, the Steering Committee was to "revise and refine" the draft legisla-
tion in advance of its introduction into the Legislative Council.
The actual Bill was introduced into the Legislative Council on 25 April
2007. It comprised 38 sections, divided into 12 parts. The Explanatory
Memorandum stated that the purpose of the Bill was to amend certain
1 Chapter 4 of the "Origin of the Species" (Charles Darwin).
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Ordinances in order to implement some of Working Party's recommen-
dations and several of the Steering Committee's recommendations. The
Steering Committee produced a further draft RHC and a Consultation
Paper in October 2007. The Bill was signed by the Chief Executive on 5
February 2008; with the Ordinance comprising 46 sections divided into 13
parts (albeit the overall structure and object of the Ordinance was as origi-
nally intended in the Bill). A further draft RHC was produced in February
2008 for renewed consultation. As indicated at the start of this article, the
aim is to have the "new" RHC and RDC in place by the Spring of 2009 and
it is reasonable to assume (at the time of writing - March 2008) that there
may be further drafts of the principal documents before the process is com-
plete.
A large number of recommendations that are not dealt with in the
Ordinance are covered by the Steering Committee's draft amended RHC.
Ironically, both the Ordinance and the draft RHC borrow heavily from the
CPR, in spite of the Working Party's decision not to adopt the CPR whole-
sale. The grinding thus retains a distinctive "Woolfian" tone.
What? - The "New" RHC
So much for the history of the Civil Justice Reforms, what of their conse-
quences?
It would be foolish to review all the changes that have survived the con-
sultation process or to examine the minutiae of the "new" RHC and RDC
in an article of this length. Instead, the focus shall be on the three most
important changes - the introduction of the underlying objectives, the new
CPR Part 36 style "sanctioned offers" and "sanctioned payments" and the
changes to the rules on discovery.
Why are these the "most important" changes? Firstly, the underlying
objectives represent a departure from the old mentality of civil litigation
and form the rationale for the courts' enhanced case management powers.
Secondly, CPR Part 36 is arguably the most successful aspect of the whole
Woolf Reform project. Their impact on the conduct in England cannot
be underestimated and it may well be that "sanctioned offers" will have an
equally dramatic effect in Hong Kong. Thirdly, many practicing lawyers
will freely tell you that discovery is the greatest generator of work and ex-
pense in the entire litigation process whilst, at the same time, much of that
work serves little real purpose. Thus, any change to the discovery process
16 All these documents can be found on the CJR website: http://www.civiljustice.gov.hk/index.html.
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will have a significant impact on the way lawyers conduct themselves and,




Recommendations 2 and 3 of the Final Report dealt with the introduction
into the RHC of an equivalent to CPR Part l's overriding objective.3 ' The
Final Report was at pains to stress that the RHC objectives would be "un-
derlying" and not "overriding", so as to avoid any suggestion that the whole
CPR was being introduced by stealth and to minimise any conflict between
the new provisions and the rest of the RHC.
The importance of these Recommendations should not be underesti-
mated despite the Working Party's attempts to minimise their significance.
Whilst they are not intended to form the basis of a new procedural meth-
odology - unlike CPR Part 1 - they may still function as, in Lord Woolf's
words, "a compass to guide courts and litigants and legal advisers as to their
general course". 38 In that respect, they represent a marked change from pre-
vious practice. No less importantly, the underlying objectives aim, in the
Working Party's own words, to "make more systematic the approach to case
management presently accepted as a matter of common law". 39 The Interim
and Final Reports both emphasised the need for improved case manage-
ment and this need was supported in the consultation exercise.
Of all the Recommendations made, these are the most significant. The
Working Party may have hedged-in the Recommendations with a rebuttal
of a new procedural code and a criticism of CPR Part 1's principle of "pro-
portionality" but, in my view, this may have little impact when the courts
start to implement the underlying objectives. As we shall now see, the
effect of the overriding objective in England was not what was originally
expected when it was introduced.
The New Rules
The Steering Committee's draft amended RHC contained new RHC Order
lA rules 1 and 2 in respect of Recommendations 2 and 3. These are set out
in Figure 2. For the sake of space, "draft" or "amended" shall be dispensed
with when referring to the Steering Committee's proposed RHC from now
on, apart from when distinguishing between the new and old RHC.
3 See the CPR website: http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules fin/index.htm.
" Lord Woolf's "Access to Justice" Final Report (AJFR), Ch 20, para 12.
39 Final Report, p 55, para 109.
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Figure 2: RHC Order 1A
1. Underlying objectives (0. lA, r. 1)
The underlying objectives of these rules are -
(a) to increase the cost-effectiveness of any practice and procedure
to be followed in relation to proceedings before the Court;
(b) to ensure that a case is dealt with as expeditiously as is reason-
ably practicable;
(c) to promote a sense of reasonable proportion and procedural
economy in the conduct of proceedings;
(d) to promote greater equality between the parties;
(e) to facilitate the settlement of disputes; and
(f) to ensure that the resources of the Court are distributed fairly.
2. Application by the Court of underlying objectives (0. lA, r. 2)
(1) The Court shall seek to give effect to the underlying objectives
of these rules when it -
(a) exercises any of its powers (whether under its inherent juris-
diction or given to it by these rules or otherwise); or
(b) interprets any of these rules or a practice direction.
(2) In giving effect to the underlying objectives of these rules, the
Court shall always recognize that the primary aim in exercising
the powers of the Court is to secure the just resolution of dis-
putes in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties.
Order 1A rule 1 matches Recommendation 3 almost word-for-word. Order
lA rules 2, 3 and 4 are almost exactly the same as CPR Part 1.2, 1.3 and
1.4 respectively (rules 3 and 4 are not repeated here - they oblige parties to
comply with underlying objectives and courts to actively manage cases). A
new Order IB (again, which is not repeated here) introduces specific case
management powers to augment Order 1A and draws heavily on CPR Part
3.1.
It would be insightful to remind ourselves of CPR Part 1.1 at this point,
so it is reproduced in Figure 3.
(2008) HKLJ
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Figure 3: CPR Part 1.1
1.1 (1) These Rules are a new procedural code with the overriding
objective of enabling the court to deal with cases justly.
(2) Dealing with a case justly includes, so far as is practicable -
(a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing;
(b) saving expense;
(c) dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate -
(i) to the amount of money involved;
(ii) to the importance of the case;
(iii) to the complexity of the issues; and
(iv) to the financial position of each party;
(d) ensuring that it is dealt with expeditiously and fairly; and
(e) allotting to it an appropriate share of the court's resourc-
es, while taking into account the need to allot resources
to other cases."
The similarities between the "radical" CPR Part 1.1 and the "incremental"
Order 1A rule 1 are quite striking. They are set out in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Comparison of RHC Order 1A rule 1 and CPR Part 1.1
Provision Draft RHC Order 1A rule 1 CPR 1.1
New procedural code 1.1(1)
Deal with cases justly 1.1(1)
Cost saving lAr.1(a) 1.1 (2)(b)
Expedition lAr.1(b) 1.1 (2)(d)
Proportionality lA r.1(c) 1.1(2)(c)
Equality between parties lAr.1(d) 1.1(2)(a)
Facilitate settlement lA r.1(e)
Distribution of court resources lA r.1(f) 1.1(2)(e)
This article shall now address both the similarities and the differences in
order to demonstrate that, when it comes to implementing and applying
overriding and underlying objectives, there may be little to choose between
the two.
New Procedural Code
There is no mention of a "new procedural code" in Order lA. This comes
as little surprise given what we have already seen of the Working Party's
approach and the consultees' desires. It is, however, worth noting that the
term has not snuck in under the proverbial radar by, say, its inclusion in a
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specific amendment to the RHC. After all, the term did not appear in the
CPR until its penultimate draft in July 1998. At the time its meaning was
a matter of much debate, especially as many members of the profession saw
the CPR as merely a plain English version of the old rules it was designed to
supplant."
The meaning, however, became clear in Biguzzi v Rank Leisure Plc," in
which the Court of Appeal held that the pre-CPR rules and authorities
would generally no longer be applied on questions of procedure, which is
hardly surprising given that Lord Woolf himself sat as part of the Court of
Appeal. Indeed, His Lordship stated quite categorically:
"The whole purpose of making the CPR a self-contained code was to
send the message which now generally applies. Earlier authorities are no
longer generally of any relevance once the CPR applies."
Whilst the English courts have, since Biguzzi, looked at pre-CPR authori-
ties on several occasions, the general position was demonstrated in Carnegie
v Giessen," where the Court of Appeal only applied pre-CPR provisions in
the complete absence of any relevant provision in the CPR itself (something
which Carnwath LJ lamented in his judgment). Over the passage of time,
with more post-CPR case law and the 46 CPR updates, this recourse has
been less common.
The intent of the authors of both the CPR and amended RHC is clear
- the CPR is "new", the amended RHC will not be. "Round One" to the
RHC "camp" then but no guidance on how the remaining underlying
objectives would be applied in a Biguzzi-type case in Hong Kong. Much
confusion and wasteful satellite litigation may be the price of this victory.
Deal with cases justly
The injunction in CPR Part 1.1 that courts should "deal with cases justly"
is not found in Order 1A rule 1 but is reflected in the requirement in Order
lA rule 2(2) that the courts are "to secure the just resolution of disputes in
accordance with the substantive rights of the parties". There are few who
would dispute that achieving justice is the sine qua non of the civil (and
criminal) courts.
There are, of course, many disputes over what "justice" actually means.
The theories of Rawls, Nozick and others will not be discussed here, nor
will any time be spent discussing the equally wide-ranging, albeit more
o There is a discussion of this point at n 1.3.9 on p 22 of English Civil Procedure (Sweet & Maxwell,
2006 edn).
41 [1999] 1 WLR 1926.
42 [2005] 1 WLR 2510.
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prosaic, differences in opinion among English judges on the subject. 3 This
article will be confined to noting that members of the judiciary have dis-
agreed over what is "just" and the balance between "justice" and "law" since
time immemorial. Lord Denning MR may have been something of a mav-
erick but he was not alone in his views regarding the relationship between
justice, equity and law and his spirit lives on in many decisions relating to
CPR Part 1.1.
What should we expect of the Hong Kong courts? The Final Report was
critical of the fact that the overriding objective had led to "absurd results"
in such cases as Law v St Margarets Insurances Ltd, 4 albeit that may be a
fault of inexperienced judges rather than CPR Part 1.1 itself.45 Neverthe-
less, it is true that the very broad nature of the overriding objective and of
"justice" itself created the opportunity for contradictory decisions, espe-
cially in the early days of the CPR. It was to avoid history repeating itself,
that the Final Report recommended the adoption of "underlying" rather
than "overriding objectives". Whether this will be sufficient to stem a tide
of peculiar applications and judgments remains to be seen. Perhaps the only
sure guarantee is thorough training of the judiciary and legal profession, but
such training must avoid becoming indoctrination.
Costs and delay
The current edition of the CPR White Book describes cost and delay as "the
twin scourges of civil justice".4 ' The CPR has, however, largely failed to cut
costs or quicken the pace of litigation. Whilst the courts have often applied
their case management powers in CPR Parts 1.4 and 3.1 to impose sanc-
tions on miscreant parties, the approach has been haphazard.4 1 Many courts
have been reluctant to promote these aspects of the overriding objective for
fear of falling foul of the others.
On other occasions, an excess of enthusiasm for thrift and speed on the
part of the lower courts has been chastised by the Court of Appeal.4 1 In this
context, it should be borne in mind that CPR Part 3.9 enables parties to
seek relief from sanctions and it is a power that the courts are often called
upon to exercise in the name of CPR Part 1.1. Clearly, the simple intro-
A good introduction to theories of justice can be found in Ch 7 of Lloyd's Introduction to Jurispru-
dence (Sweet & Maxwell, 7th edn).
[2001] EWCA Civ 30.
45 Final Report, p 49, para 97.
4' English Civil Procedure, p 12, n 1.3.4.
47 The English courts' approach is on a case-by-case basis which, understandably, can create the im-
pression of inconsistency.
' Barry Parker v Laurence Snyder and Ors LTL 1/4/2003. The claim was struck out and a draft
amended Particulars of Claim was rejected by the lower court. The Court of Appeal accepted that
the claim was not "crisply pleaded" but it disclosed a viable cause of action and was therefore rein-
stated.
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duction of a rule to cut costs or speed up litigation is not enough; it takes
a change in attitude on the part of the litigants, the legal advisers and the
judiciary. Whether the Hong Kong courts have any greater success than
their English counterparts will not depend on the replication of CPR Parts
1.4 and 3.1 in Order 1A but on the attitudes towards litigation inculcated
in themselves and in others by the judges.
Proportionality
The Final Report was critical of the nature of "proportionality" within the
CPR. Whilst it was accepted that "proportionality" should be included in
the proposed underlying objectives, it should not have "the specificity of
CPR Part 1.1(2)(c)". The Final Report preferred an approach that would
"be a reminder that commonsense notions of reasonableness and a sense of
proportion should inform the exercise of a judicial discretion".
Oddly, the Working Party and the Steering Committee seem not to
have grasped the most significant practical expression of "proportionality"
in the CPR. The Interim and Final Reports make only a fleeting reference
to it. The draft RHC is silent on it. This is "Track Allocation".
Under CPR Part 26 every claim is allocated by the court to one of three
procedural tracks - the small claims track; fast track; or multi-track. Alloca-
tion usually takes place after the defence has been served and the court has
received completed allocation questionnaires from the parties (although
the court need not wait for these if they are late). These allocation ques-
tionnaires contain information on the value of the claim, the number of
witnesses and so on to help the judge decide upon the appropriate track.
Allocation can be dealt with at a hearing or on paper.
The key factor in track allocation is the monetary value of the claim,
although a claim may be allocated to a track which is not the usual one for
its value if the court decides that it can be dealt with more justly in another
track. The small claims track is for consumer disputes, minor accidents and
the like with a value not exceeding £5,000 (HK$76,500 in February 2008).
The procedures are informal and the parties do not automatically receive
their legal costs (hence litigants in person are very common). The fast track
is generally for claims between £5,000 and £15,000 (HK$229,500), with a
set procedural timetable which discourages interlocutory applications and
aims to bring the parties to a one-day trial within a year of proceedings hav-
ing commenced. The multi-track is for claims above £15,000 or where the
issues will need more than a one-day trial to be resolved. There is much
greater scope for the parties to control the timetable to trial in multi-track
cases albeit the court still has the final word.
The procedural tracks were seen as the CPR's "reinvention" of the sepa-
rate rules for the small claims tribunals, County Courts and High Court.
In many respects, the Hong Kong system already caters adequately enough
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for the differing value and complexity of cases in its existing rules. The dif-
ference between the two systems is that in England there is one procedure
for issuing and pleading most claims, with allocation taking place at a later
stage and at the direction of the court. This simplifies both the issuing of
proceedings and the pleadings stages and avoids unnecessary jurisdictional
disputes. It is a shame that, whilst the proposed RHC simplify the issuing
of proceedings and enhance the courts' case management, adopting such a
stratified approach in Hong Kong seems to have been overlooked. The po-
tential administrative costs savings may have made it very worthwhile.
Equality
Under CPR Part 1.1 (2) (a) the overriding objective entails "ensuring that
the parties are on an equal footing". This reflects the right to "equality of
arms" under Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR"), to which the UK is
a signatory and which was given further effect by the Human Rights Act
1998. By this right, each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
present his, her or its case in conditions which are not overly advantageous
to the other party or parties.49
One of the greatest such inequalities is the ability to pay for a good - or
any - lawyer. The inadequacies of Legal Aid (now known as Community
Legal Service) in England will be known to many readers. The financial
limits (eligibility depends on a maximum monthly disposable income not
exceeding E672, albeit parties will be expected to contribute towards costs
if they have over E289 per month") combined with the fact that various
categories of work including personal injury and libel claims are excluded
explains the growth in litigants in person. The European Court of Human
Rights was markedly critical of these developments in the infamous "McLi-
bel" case51 when it stated that:
"the denial of legal aid to the applicants [Steel and Morris, who con-
ducted a 313 day libel trial against McDonald's largely on their own] had
deprived them of the opportunity to present their case effectively before
the court and contributed to an unacceptable inequality of arms with
McDonald's"
49 De Haes v Belgium (1998) 25 EHRR 1.
50 Figures correct at time of writing but subject to review - see the LSC website http://www.legalserv-
ices.gov.uk/1sconline.asp.
51 Steel v United Kingdom [2005] EMLR 15.
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CPR Part 1.1(2) (a) does not address this point directly nor, for that matter,
is there any other provision in the CPR to "give" representation to litigants
in person or "subtract" an over-abundance of lawyers from their opponents.
Instead, the CPR seeks to prevent wealthier parties from "playing the
system" at the expense of their weaker opponents. The increased case
management powers and the three procedural tracks are both part of this
process. A wealthy party will not recover his legal costs in the Small Claims
Track and will only obtain fixed costs at a Fast Track trial. In addition, the
Small Claims Track is very informal, hence litigants in person cannot be
"blinded by science" or bullied by teams of opposition lawyers and the Fast
Track has set procedural timetable, preventing multiple interlocutory appli-
cations. In addition, in Maltez v Lewis," the applicant sought to prevent the
respondent from instructing senior counsel given that he "only" had junior
counsel. The court refused to make the order sought but held that it could
"level the playing field" by, for example, allowing a poorer party (or rather
its smaller firm of solicitors) more time to prepare court bundles or ordering
the wealthier party (or its larger firm of solicitors) to carry out the task in-
stead.
The rule in the RHC is subtly different to that in CPR Part 1, as it says
at Order 1A rule 1(d) that the aim is "to promote greater equality between
the parties". As stated above, the language of the provision is that of Rec-
ommendation 3 of the Final Report. Unfortunately, the Final Report is
silent on what it means by "greater equality" which, as few would deny, is a
term pregnant with meaning. A conservative assumption would be that it
means the same as CPR Part 1 and that the different language is of no prac-
tical concern. This is not as straightforward as it seems, however, given that
the CPR draws upon jurisprudence developed under the ECHR. Is the sug-
gestion that such European case law is now to be applied, albeit indirectly,
in Hong Kong?
Yet, even if the intended meaning is the same, why say "greater equal-
ity" rather than "equal footing" when the former is such a loaded term? The
danger (or maybe the intention) is that the term "greater equality" could be
employed to argue any number of restrictions upon or enhancements of par-
ties' freedom of action. Even under the relatively restrained "equal footing"
the English courts were able, in cases such as Maltez, to shift administra-
tive burdens to wealthier parties. What is to stop a judge espousing "greater
equality" when exercising his discretion in the interpretation of evidence
or even substantive law to shift other burdens onto who he sees as a less
52 (1999) The Times, 4 May 1999.
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deserving party? Lord Denning was able to effect much change (or mis-
chief) with far fewer tools at his disposal.
Facilitating settlement
The provision in Order 1A rule 1(e) that courts should "facilitate the
settlement of disputes" is found in CPR Part 1.4(f) among the elements of
active case management. "Facilitating settlement" is commonly understood
to include encouraging the parties to try ADR, usually mediation. ADR is
actively promoted elsewhere in the CPR, in the pre-action protocols and
in the individual court guides such as that of the Commercial Court, which
states that legal representatives "should" - not "ought" or "may" - consider
with their clients and the other parties, the possibility of attempting to re-
solve their dispute by ADR.53
Whether or not the parties consider ADR is also relevant to costs in
England. CPR Part 44.5(3)(a)(ii) states "The court must also have regard
to... the efforts made, if any, before and during the proceedings in order to
try to resolve the dispute" when exercising its discretion as to costs. Several
courts have also operated pilot compulsory mediation schemes since 1999,
despite mixed records as to their success.5
All this is evidence of the enthusiasm of the English courts for ADR
in general and mediation in particular. Indeed CPR Part 44.5(3)(a)(ii) is
both the proverbial "stick and carrot" in respect of ADR and this has been
demonstrated in the post-CPR case law. Many parties that have refused to
consider ADR, or only paid lip service to doing so, have been penalised on
costs by the courts. As early as Dyson v Leeds City Council,55 Ward LJ stated
that:
"the court has powers to take a strong view about the rejection of the
encouraging noises we [the courts] are making [about ADR], if necessary
by imposing eventual orders for indemnity costs or indeed ordering that
a higher rate of interest be paid on any damages"
This willingness to take such a "strong view" was demonstrated by the
Court of Appeal in Dunnett v Railtrack plc. 56 The Court of Appeal reiterated
both that it was a lawyer's duty to further the overriding objective under
13 Admiralty and Commercial Court Guide (HM Court Service, 7th edn, 2006) s G, para 01.4.
4 The UK Ministry of Justice commissioned Professor Dame Hazel Genn to conduct research on the
Automatic Referral to Mediation (ARM) pilot scheme at the Central London County Court in
2004-2005. The findings of this research are contained in "Twisting Arms: Court referred and
court linked mediation under judicial pressure" (see Ministry of Justice website at http://www.
justice.gov.uk/publications/research2lO5O7.htm).
[2000] CP Rep 42
[2002] 2 All ER 850.
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CPR Part 1.1 and that if parties turned down ADR they could suffer costs
consequences. Here the defendant, Railtrack, had been confident of success
and had therefore refused to consent to mediation. Thus, despite winning
at trial and on appeal, and having made a CPR Part 36 Payment which the
plaintiff rejected, Railtrack did not receive an order for costs in its favour.
Yet it would be wrong to assume that the courts take a purely "all or
nothing" view of ADR. For example, in Hurst v Leeming17 it was held that a
barrister was justified in refusing mediation in a professional negligence ac-
tion where the character and attitude of the plaintiff meant that "mediation
had no real prospect of getting anywhere". On the other hand, the enforce-
ability of dispute resolution clauses in commercial contracts - by which
parties may be obliged to try ADR before suing - was upheld in Cable &
Wireless plc v IBM United Kingdom Limited" where Colman J made the tell-
ing comment:
"For the courts now to decline to enforce contractual references to ADR
on the grounds of intrinsic uncertainty would be to fly in the face of
public policy as expressed in the CPR and as reflected in the judgment
of the Court of Appeal in Dunnett v Railtrack".
In the leading case of Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust59 the Court
of Appeal reviewed the preceding case law and held that if the unsuccess-
ful party (the prospective costs payer) could show that the successful party
(the payee) had acted unreasonably in refusing to agree to ADR, the former
would not have to pay the latter its costs. In deciding whether a party had
acted unreasonably the court was to remember the "advantages" of media-
tion over litigation"o (although recognising that mediation and other forms
of ADR were not a "panacea"). When reaching its decision the court was
also to consider the nature of the dispute; the merits of the case; the extent
to which other settlement methods had been attempted; if the ADR had a
reasonable prospect of success; and whether a successful party had refused to
agree to ADR despite the court's "encouragement".
1 (2003) 1 Lloyd's Rep 379,
" [2002]2 All ER 1041.
* [2004] 1 WLR 3002.
6o In Dyson LJ's words, at para 15 of his judgment, "It is usually less expensive than litigation which
goes all the way to judgment, although it should not be overlooked that most cases are settled by
negotiation in the ordinary way. Mediation provides litigants with a wider range of solutions than
those that are available in litigation: for example, an apology; an explanation; the continuation of
an existing professional or business relationship perhaps on new terms; and an agreement by one
party to do something without any existing legal obligation to do so."
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Subsequently, in Reed Executive PLC and Others v Reed Business Infor-
mation Ltd and Others,6 1 the Court of Appeal upheld a party's refusal to
mediate and held that a court cannot order disclosure of completely "without
prejudice" communications, whereas "without prejudice save as to costs"
(ie Calderbank Letter) communications could be disclosed to determine
whether the refusal to mediate was reasonable or not. By contrast, the
Halsey principles were applied in Burchell v Bullard62 to hold that a refusal
to mediate had been unreasonable and in Mona Al-Khatib v Abdullah Masry
& Others," the Court of Appeal held, albeit obiter, that there is "no case,
however conflicted" that cannot be mediated.
Thus, in England, the general view remains that parties need to give
- and show that they have given - serious consideration to mediation or
another form of ADR if they are to avoid being penalised by the courts.
What of the Hong Kong approach? ADR in general and mediation in
particular have not traditionally featured very highly in legal advisers' vo-
cabulary, with the exception of those involved in construction and family
disputes. One of the few reported decisions in the Hong Kong courts on
mediation, Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co Ltd v Vigour Ltd , saw
the Hong Kong Court of Appeal negatively distinguish Cable & Wireless
and hold that a dispute resolution clause which stated "failing an ultimate
agreement [after negotiations] then both parties shall agree and submit to
Third Party Mediation procedure" was in fact unenforceable. An appeal of
this decision was rejected by the Court of Final Appeal." Thus the Hong
Kong approach to date has been very different to that in England and other
common law jurisdictions. This is, however, changing rapidly.
The prominence of "facilitating settlement" in Order 1A rule 1 gave an
early clue as to the thinking of the authorities. The Working Party's views
were equally revealing. The Interim Report put forward six options on the
courts and ADR - ranging from them having the power to order the par-
ties to engage in ADR; to making adverse costs orders against parties who
refused ADR without good reason (as in England); to simply "encouraging
and facilitating purely voluntary ADR".66
The Final Report dealt with the concerns raised by consultees about
these Proposals in what can only be described as a robust fashion be-
fore recommending that the courts should to provide parties with bet-
ter information and support "with a view to encouraging purely voluntary
61 [2004] 4 All ER 942.
62 [2005] EWCA Civ 358.
61 [2005] 1 FLR 381.
64 [2005] 3 HKLRD 723.
65 Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co Ltd v Vigour Ltd [2006] HKEC 306.
66 Interim Report, pp 232-250, s K21.
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mediation"; that the Legal Aid Department should have power to limit its
initial funding to the funding of mediation when appropriate; and that the
courts should be able to make adverse costs orders in cases where mediation
has been unreasonably refused.
Whilst these recommendations do not appear within the draft RHC,
much to the disappointment of many interested parties," the presence of
the draft Order 1A rule 1(e) is, in this author's view, a sufficient building
block for the Hong Kong courts to develop an English approach to ADR.
The authorities are, however, going to go much further.
In a speech in March 2006," the Secretary for Justice noted that media-
tion was not as popular in Hong Kong as elsewhere and ascribed this to the
attitudes of parties and lawyers. He concluded with the words "Mediation is
very much on my agenda". If that was not enough, in his Policy Address in
October 2007, the Chief Executive stated:
"To alleviate conflicts and foster harmony, we will promote the de-
velopment of mediation services. On many occasions, interpersonal
conflicts need not go to court. Mediation can reduce social costs and
help the parties concerned to rebuild their relationship. This is a new
trend in advanced regions around the world. The cross-sector working
group headed by the Secretary for Justice will map out plans to employ
mediation more extensively and effectively in handling higher-end com-
mercial disputes and relatively small-scale local disputes."
The Secretary for Justice's group has subsequently started work on these
plans. Moreover, at a Conference in November 2007 both the Justice Sec-
retary and Chief Justice praised mediation as a means of resolving disputes.
The Chief Justice went so far as to say that ADR should be a compulsory
part of law students' education.69
Further, in each of their speeches at the Ceremonial Opening of the
2008 Legal Year, both the Secretary for Justice and the Chief Justice reiter-
ated the importance and value of mediation and stressed the work that was
going on to promote its use. 70 Hence, it seems that the official Hong Kong
approach to mediation is now as enthusiastic as that in England. Conse-
quently, of all the concepts embodied by the "overriding" or "underlying
67 ADR Chambers (HK) Limited expressed its disappointment that none of the ADR related recom-
mendations in the Final Report were mentioned in the Steering Committee's Consultation Paper
on the Draft Bill, in a letter to the Legislative Council Secretariat of 5 June 2007.
68 See http://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/archive/index2006.htm#ssj.
6' South China Morning Post, 1 Dec 2007.
7o See http://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/public/.
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objectives", the courts' promotion of settlement may prove to be the most
far-reaching.
Sanctioned Offers and Payments
The Working Party and Steering Committee
The Interim Report dealt with the workings of CPR Part 36 at some length
and proposed the adoption of similar provisions in Hong Kong." In the
Final Report, it was noted that "The response elicited in the consultation
on this Proposal was enthusiastic".72 Indeed, it may be possible to say that
this was the most popular of the Proposals in the Interim Report. As a con-
sequence, Recommendation 38 of the Final Report was for the adoption of
"sanctioned offers and payments along the lines of CPR Part 36" subject to
modifications, such as their only being available after the commencement
of proceedings.
The draft RHC contains a new Order 22, which replicates much of CPR
Part 36 (as it once looked). It is supplemented by a new Order 22A which
deals with miscellaneous matters relating to money remaining in court and
payments out. It seems likely that the new regime of sanctioned offers and
payments will come into force largely unscathed in 2009. Should it?
CPR Part 36 - before April 2007
The purpose of CPR Part 36 is simple - it is to persuade parties to settle
their disputes." This reflects UK public policy that settlements are better
than trials. Settlements bring "closure" (commercial or emotional), save
money and save court time. A party who receives a reasonable CPR Part 36
offer or payment should (all other things being equal) accept it. If it is de-
clined, and the offeree wins at trial, the offeror will still obtain its costs from
the date the offer expired if the offeree fails to "beat" 4 the offer or payment
at trial. The offeree therefore pays the price of prolonging the claim unnec-
essarily.
It is important to appreciate that CPR Part 36 originally provided for
both payments and offers by defendants. The former are no longer required
under the CPR but the proposed RHC regime maintains them. Payments
involved paying the sum being offered into court and sending the offeree a
formal notice of that payment. Defendants were required by CPR Part 36.3
to make a payment into court in conjunction with a CPR Part 36 offer in
money claims (provided proceedings were issued) otherwise the offer would
71 Interim Report, paras 317-323, pp 122-127 and Proposal 15.
n Final Report, paras 291- 3 2 4, pp 144-160, s 11.
7 This can be gleaned from reading the notes to CPR Part 36 and from numerous commentaries over
the years since the provisions' introduction.
7 This term will be explained shortly.
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not generally "count" as a CPR Part 36 offer (unless the court ordered oth-
erwise). Defendants could, however, make a CPR Part 36 offer without an
accompanying payment in both non-money claims and before proceedings
had been issued in money claims. An offeree would be given 21 days in
which to accept an offer or payment.
An innovation of CPR Part 36 was the introduction of plaintiffs' CPR
Part 36 offers. These are made by a "without prejudice save as to costs"
letter which is open for acceptance for 21 days. If a defendant rejects a
plaintiff's offer and the plaintiff subsequently "beats" its own offer at trial,
the defendant not only pays the damages and costs but could be made to
pay interest on the damages at up to 10 per cent above base rate; indemnity
basis costs; and interest on those costs at up to 10 per cent above base rate
(the interest runs from the expiry of the plaintiffs offer)."
A cursory knowledge of civil litigation is enough to appreciate how
and why CPR Part 36 offers and payments are so effective. A "greedy" liti-
gant who turns down a sensible offer or payment proposal risks bearing all
the costs of the proceedings after the point at which he or she could have
settled. As can be seen from the diagram in Figure 5, the costs of litigation
increase over the duration of the claim but they may not do so in a straight
line.76 Certain stages of litigation, preparing witnesses statements for exam-
ple, involve a great deal of work on the part of the legal advisers and some
disbursements, such as experts' reports, can be especially expensive. The
approach to trial and trial itself is often the most cost intensive part of the
process. Thus, not only is it prudent to make a Part 36 offer or payment as
early as possible - to increase the cost pressure on the other side - it is often
wise to make the offer just before a particularly costly stage of the claim in
order to focus the other side's mind on the benefits of settlement.
" Readers will appreciate the similarity with Calderbank Letters.
76 This diagram is not particularly scientific and the gradations of costs can differ greatly between
cases but it demonstrates the progression of costs of the course of a claim and - especially - the
escalation at trial.
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CPR Part 36 - current version
On 6 April 2007, CPR Part 36 was radically altered. CPR Part 36 payments
were abolished, as were many of the provisions flowing from the distinction
between payments and offers. Under a rewritten CPR 37 payments into
court are now limited to payments made under court orders, payments in
support of a defence of tender before claim, and payments under various en-
actments.
The changes to CPR Part 36 had been prompted by a consultation paper
"Part 36 of the Civil Procedure Rules: Offers to settle and payments into
court"n7 published on 12 January 2006 by the UK Department of Consti-
tutional Affairs (DCA).7' This consultation had, in turn, arisen from a
number of judgments on the freedom of certain categories of defendant
from making CPR Part 36 payments. In Crouch v King's Healthcare NHS
Trust"' and The Trustees of Stokes Pension Fund v Western Power Distribution
(South West) plc," the Court of Appeal held that certain categories of de-
fendant - namely, Government departments and insurers - need only make
Part 36 offers without supporting CPR Part 36 payments as they were, to
n7 This can be found at the DCAs website http://WWW.dca.gov.uk/consult/civilproc36/cp0206.hitm.
71 The functions of the DCA were transferred to a new Ministry of Justice on 9 May 2007.
79 [2005] 1 All ER 207.
so [2005] 1 WLR 3595.
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put it bluntly, "good for the money". The Court of Appeal had used the "if
the court so orders" exception within CPR Part 36.1(2) to justify these de-
cisions.
The DCA wished to clarify the rules in the light of these decisions.
Of the 61 responses received during the consultation, almost all of them
supported a change whereby defendants need no longer pay any money
into court in support of a CPR Part 36 offer. Consequently, the rules were
changed, much to the satisfaction of those who regarded them as an unfair
imposition on defendants. Unfortunately, other problems with the CPR
Part 36 regime remain and these problems will also arrive in Hong Kong
with the introduction of sanctioned offers and payments, unless steps are
taken to avoid them.
Sanctioned offers and payments
The provisions of the new Order 22 are very close to those of the pre-April
2007 CPR Part 36. For example, Order 22 rule 3(1) is quite explicit that "An
offer by a defendant to settle the whole or part of a claim or an issue arising
from the claim does not have the consequences set out in this Order unless
it is made by way of a sanctioned offer or sanctioned payment or both". Or-
der 22 rule 3(2) adds "Where an offer by a defendant involves a payment of
money to the Plaintiff, the offer must be made by way of a sanctioned pay-
ment". This point will be revisited shortly.
By Order 22 rule 9 a sanctioned offer or payment is made when it is
"served" on the offeree. Under the old CPR Part 36 and an earlier version
of the draft RHC, offers (and payments) were made when "received". Under
the revised CPR Part 36, offers are also made when "served", which brings
them into line with the CPR provisions on deemed service. Sadly, this
desire for uniformity overlooks the fact that the English rules on deemed
service have themselves been criticised for their inflexibility.81 Fortunately,
the RHC avoids this potential trap. As with the old (and new) CPR Part
36, there is also provision for parties to seek the clarification of sanctioned
offers and payments.
81 It was held by the Court of Appeal in Anderton v Clwyd CC [2002] 1 WLR 3174 that the deemed
day of service of a claim form under CPR Part 6.7 cannot be rebutted by evidence of the actual
receipt of the claim form by the defendant. As the deemed date of service of a letter sent by first-
class post is the second day after it was posted, a letter posted at, say, 5pm on a Friday in the UK
would be deemed served on the following Sunday despite the fact that the postal service does not
make deliveries on Sundays. Evidence of its receipt on the Monday (which would demonstrate rare
speed on the part of the UK post!) would be discounted. Further, it would be deemed served before
a fax of the same letter if that fax was transmitted at 4.10pm on the same Friday. The fax would be
deemed served on the following Monday, irrespective of a fax transmission report showing a suc-
cessful transmission at 4.1Opm.
82 Practice Direction 19.2 also provides for deemed service by post but permits the rebuttal of deemed
service by evidence of actual service.
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Unlike CPR Part 36, the new Order 22 provides that sanctioned offers
and payments will be "open" for 28 days. The CPR sets down a 21 day pe-
riod. The Final Report does not advocate the need for a longer time period
but, on reflection, it is probably no bad thing to give parties a little extra
time to consider the value of settling. In any event, there is nothing to
prevent acceptance after this period provided the parties agree costs or the
court grants leave (it seems likely that the Hong Kong courts would grant
leave except in difficult cases, as they generally do in England). There is
also nothing to stop parties agreeing settlement terms outside the scope of
Order 22 provided they are willing to forego the strict costs protections.
It is also the case that any offers or payments to or by minors will need
the court's approval under Order 22 rule 15 and Order 80 rule 10, which
mirrors the old CPR Part 36.18 (now deleted) and CPR Part 21.10. Whilst
it is eminently sensible that the court should protect the interests of minors,
it is worth noting the case of Drinkall v Whitwood," in which a motorist
argued that a settlement with a child, who had been badly injured in an ac-
cident with his car, was not binding in the absence of court approval under
CPR Part 21.10. The Court of Appeal was obliged "regrettably" (in its own
words) to agree with the motorist and therefore hold that he could renege
on the settlement as it had not yet been approved by the court. In such
circumstances, parties may be tempted to opt for tightly worded deed of
settlement or solicitors' undertakings rather than trust to Order 22.
The principal problems with the operation of CPR Part 36 in England,
which could be repeated within sanctioned offers and payments, have been
due to a perceived anti-defendant bias. The first aspect of this is (or was)
the need for defendants in money claims to support their CPR Part 36 of-
fers with CPR Part 36 payments. The rationale for this rule - which was not
part of Lord Woolf's original "Access to Justice" report - was that plaintiffs
needed a guarantee that such offers were genuine. A secondary, and largely
unspoken, rationale was that all defendants were assumed not to be making
genuine offers.
Not only did this undermine the very spirit of CPR Part 36, to encour-
age mutually beneficial settlements between parties, in that it harks back to
an adversarial approach to litigation, it was not actually borne out by the
evidence. According to the DCA, approximately 70 to 80 per cent of CPR
Part 36 Payments in England and Wales are made by public sector and in-
sured defendants, who can generally be considered "good for the money". It
was the recognition that certain defendants were certainly "sound" that was
behind the decisions in Crouch and Western Power. Consequently, as already
" [2004] 4 All ER 378.
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noted, the post-April 2007 CPR Part 36 does not require any defendants to
pay money into court in support of a Part 36 offer. Plaintiffs are safeguarded
from possible prejudice by CPR Part 36.4(2) by which an offer to pay all or
part of a claim at a date later than 14 days following acceptance is not treat-
ed as a Part 36 offer unless the offeree accepts such postponed payment. It
is submitted that the new Order 22 rule 3 should be recast before it comes
into force to reflect this reform of CPR Part 36.
Another bias in the CPR, which has been partially avoided in the RHC,
is the different interest and costs treatment of plaintiffs' and defendants'
offers. In England, if a defendant makes an offer (or payment) which is re-
jected by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff "fails to do better" than this offer
or payment the court "shall order the plaintiff to pay any costs" incurred by
the defendant after the last date on which the payment or offer could have
been accepted (without leave) unless it considers it "unjust to do so". This
seems fair enough until one considers the defendant's position vis a plain-
tiff's offer. Where a plaintiff does better than his or her own CPR Part 36
offer the Court may order "extra" interest on the damages awarded to the
plaintiff at a rate not exceeding 10 per cent above base rate for the period
since the last date on which the defendant could have accepted the offer.
The smell of punitive damages lingers about this provision. In addition, the
plaintiff may be awarded costs on the indemnity basis and "extra" interest
on those costs at a rate not exceeding 10 per cent above base rate.
Under the CPR, the award of indemnity costs where a successful
plaintiff beats his or her own Part 36 offer is not "fault based"." Further,
indemnity costs are often awarded irrespective of the size of the plaintiffs
offer in relation to the eventual judgment (or the number of liable de-
fendants) provided the former is exceeded by the latter.85 By contrast, a
defendant making a successful CPR Part 36 offer will usually be awarded
costs on the standard basis. They will only receive costs on the indemnity
basis if the court wishes to "condemn" the plaintiff's conduct. In HLB Kid-
sons v Lloyds Underwriters,86 the court held that the plaintiff would not have
to pay indemnity costs as there needed to be some conduct or circumstance
taking the case "out of the norm". Although the plaintiff's rejection of the
" McPhilemy v Times Newspapers Ltd (Costs) [2001] 4 All ER 861. The trial judge had declined to or-
der indemnity costs because of the "stigma" attached to them. The Court of Appeal overturned his
decision.
Humpheryes v Nedcon UK Ltd (Costs) [2004] EWHC 2558. The plaintiff had made a CPR Part 36
offer to the first defendant, which had been rejected. The first defendant argued that, as it was li-
able for only two thirds of the judgment, the plaintiff had not "beaten" its own CPR Part 36 offer.
The court held that the first defendant was liable to the plaintiff for the whole of the judgment
sum - irrespective of the apportionment.
86 [2007] EWHC 2699.
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defendant's CPR Part 36 offer had been "wrong", it was not "out of the
norm".
Fortunately Order 22 rules 19 and 20 maintain that both plaintiffs and
defendants may be entitled to their "costs on the indemnity basis from the
latest date on which the [other side] could have accepted the payment or
offer without requiring the leave of the Court" and "interest on those costs
at a rate not exceeding 10 per cent above judgment rate" if their opponent
fails to accept a reasonable offer or payment. Thus a significant bias in CPR
Part 36 is avoided. Sadly, Order 22 rule 20(2) adopts the provisions in CPR
Part 36 on enhanced interest on the damages awarded to a plaintiff where
he or she "beats" his or her own offer. It is hoped that the version of the
RHC that is ultimately adopted will be amended so as to prevent this form
of punitive damages from being imported into Hong Kong.
Finally, on the question of "beating" the other side's offer, it should be
noted that Order 22 rules 19 and 20 both quite clearly state that a plaintiff
needs to "do better" than his own or a defendant's sanctioned offer (or pay-
ment) in order to obtain a beneficial costs order. This position is based on
the pre-April 2007 CPR Part 36. Unfortunately, for English defendants,
CPR Part 36.14 on the costs consequences following judgment now reads as
follows:
"36.14 (1) This rule applies where upon judgment being entered -
(a) a claimant fails to obtain a judgment more advantageous than a
defendant's Part 36 offer; or
(b) judgment against the defendant is at least as advantageous to the
claimant as the proposals contained in a claimant's Part 36 of-
fer." (emphasis added)
The change is subtle but clear. Plaintiffs in England no longer have to beat
their own offers, merely match them, to obtain indemnity costs and extra
interest on their damages and costs. It is a little change, but it is a signifi-
cant one nonetheless and does not seem to be motivated by a desire to do
justice. Whilst this author would encourage the Hong Kong authorities to
adopt some parts of the new CPR Part 36 in place of the current proposals
in Order 22, it is sincerely hoped that they would avoid this unfair provi-
sion.




Discovery has been labelled as an engine of costs in civil litigation.7 There
are few practitioners who will, when challenged, be able to deny that in
most cases (even the most complicated ones) the court's decision is made
on little more than a handful of the often voluminous quantity of docu-
ments in the trial bundles. Lord Woolf himself criticised the process of
pre-CPR discovery and the Peruvian Guano test in his "Access to Justice"
Interim Report.88
The proposed solution to this problem was the introduction of standard
disclosure, which is set out in Figure 6.89
Figure 6: CPR Part 31.6
Standard disclosure requires a party to disclose only -
(a) the documents on which he relies; and
(b) the documents which -
(i) adversely affect his own case;
(ii) adversely affect another party's case; or
(iii) support another party's case; and
(c) the documents which he is required to disclose by a relevant
practice direction.
The duty is also limited, by CPR Part 31.8 only to those documents which
are or have been in a party's "control" (those which are or were in its physi-
cal possession; it has or had a right to possess; or it has or had a right to
copy and/or inspect). Further, a party need only carry out a "reasonable
search" for those documents within CPR Part 31.6 when giving standard
disclosure.
Conversely, the CPR also introduced measures - at Lord Woolf's
prompting - extending the scope of discovery. These were pre-action and
Not least by Lord Woolf and the Civil Justice Reform Working Party.
8 Lord Woolf MR wrote at Ch 21, para 17 in his "Access to Justice" Interim Report - "The result
of the Peruvian Guano decision was to make virtually unlimited the range of potentially relevant
(and therefore discoverable) documents, which parties and their lawyers are obliged to review and
list, and which the other side is obliged to read, against the knowledge that only a handful of such
documents will affect the outcome of the case. In that sense, it is a monumentally inefficient proc-
ess, especially in the larger cases. The more conscientiously it is carried out, the more inefficient it
is."
9 "Disclosure" is the term now used in England, but throughout this article, "discovery" shall be used
for the overall process to avoid confusion.
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non-party discovery in all cases, which had previously only been available
in personal injury and fatal accident cases (the current position in Hong
Kong). The operative terms of the relevant provisions are at Figure 7.
Figure 7: CPR Part 31.16 - pre-action discovery
(3) The court may make an order under this rule only where -
(a) the respondent is likely to be a party to subsequent proceed-
ings;
(b) the applicant is also likely to be a party to those proceedings;
(c) if proceedings had started, the respondent's duty by way of
standard disclosure, set out in rule 31.6, would extend to the
documents or classes of documents of which the applicant
seeks disclosure; and
(d) disclosure before proceedings have started is desirable in order
to -
(i) dispose fairly of the anticipated proceedings;
(ii) assist the dispute to be resolved without proceedings; or
(iii) save costs.
CPR Part 31.17 - non-party discovery
(3) The court may make an order under this rule only where -
(a) the documents of which disclosure is sought are likely to sup-
port the case of the applicant or adversely affect the case of
one of the other parties to the proceedings; and
(b) disclosure is necessary in order to dispose fairly of the claim or
to save costs.
Under both provisions, the applicant must support the application with
evidence (going to the reasons for the discovery sought) and the order must
specify the documents or the classes of documents which are to be disclosed.
Thus, CPR Parts 31.16 and 31.17 cannot be used for "fishing expeditions".
Finally, CPR Part 31.12 maintains specific discovery (which is further
explained by Practice Direction 31 paragraph 5) and CPR Part 31.18 ex-
plicitly sets out that CPR Parts 31.16 and 31.17 "do not limit any other
power which the court may have to order" discovery before proceedings or
against non-parties. Hence Bankers' Trust and Norwich Pharmacal90 orders
9 Bankers Trust Co v Shapira [1980] 3 All ER 353; Norwich Pharmacal Co v Commissioners of Customs
and Excise [1974] AC 133.
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are preserved, albeit the scope of the latter has changed since 1999, as will
be shown shortly.
The Working Party and Steering Committee
In its Interim Report, the Working Party proposed retaining the automatic
obligation to give discovery but to limit its scope to that in CPR Part 31.6.
It was also suggested that parties should be free to agree the scope of the
discovery they intended to give, failing which the default position would
be that in CPR Part 31.6. In its Final Report, the Working Party stated
that "The weight of opinion among respondents to the consultation was
significantly against adopting either of these Proposals and in favour of re-
taining the Peruvian Guano principles".91 The rationale behind keeping the
Peruvian Guano test was that, in Hong Kong, the problem was not excessive
discovery but too little discovery. It was also suggested by some consultees
that a narrower test would increase costs as more senior (and therefore more
expensive) lawyers would need to be involved in the discovery process. It
was also suggested that the reform of discovery in the CPR Part 31 had not
produced any notable cost savings.
These responses demonstrate that the importance of the discovery pro-
cess and its practical implementation are not taken seriously enough by
some members of the Hong Kong legal profession. Perhaps those consultees
who opposed its reform should ask themselves whether the inadequacy of
discovery is because of the fact that it is a job that is doled out to inexperi-
enced staff? As has already been noted, when cases come to trial, the court
often ignores all but a handful of the documents that are placed in the trial
bundles. The cost of collating, analysing and accommodating the rest into
witness statements and experts' reports is arguably thrown away. Would it
not make sense to avoid this pointless and expensive exercise by focusing
at the outset on the documents that actually go to the heart of the dispute?
The failure of CPR Part 31 - if it is accepted to have failed - in England is
not a failure of the rule itself but of the courts in failing to manage litigation
and of the parties and their lawyers' desire to discover and seek the discov-
ery of every possible scrap of paper. There are very rarely any Perry Mason
style "smoking gun" documents and people should stop looking for them.
Sadly, the Working Party was persuaded to drop its proposals and the
Final Report contained, as Recommendation 80, a call for the maintenance
of the Peruvian Guano test and, at Recommendation 73, a call for a practice
direction "designed with a view to encouraging the parties to achieve econ-
omies in the discovery process by agreement; and to encouraging the courts,
in appropriate cases, to give directions with the same aim". This more
91 Final Report, para 472, p 243.
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modest proposal on controlling discovery has found its way into the RHC,
as will be shown shortly.
In a more enlightened frame of mind, the Final Report noted the con-
sultees' broad agreement with the extension of pre-action and non-party
discovery along the lines of CPR Parts 31.16 and 31.17. The Ordinance
contains provisions to implement these recommendations with regard to
the High Court and District Court. The Recommendations are also incor-
porated into the draft RHC, which shall now be covered.
Case Management of Discovery
In its Final Report, the Working Party recommended the adoption of case
management timetabling and milestones. The first stage of this process
would be at the summons for directions stage. The parties would be required
to complete questionnaires "giving specified information and estimates
concerning the case" to facilitate future case management and also to pro-
pose directions and a timetable to then be ordered by the court. A further
recommendation was that the court, if it thought it "desirable", could fix a
date for a case management conference (CMC) and the other milestones
up to and beyond that date. These recommendations have been inserted
into Order 25, the name of which has also been amended to "Case Manage-
ment Summons and Conference".
CMCs are provided for by the CPR, indeed they are a major part of the
"new procedural framework", and the new provisions in the RHC reflect
the English rules. It is important to appreciate that CMCs are designed to
be more than a rejuvenated Summons for Directions. The court is required
to consider all the relevant matters in the case. This duty is also contained
in Order 25 rule 2 but the wording doesn't explain the difference that
CMCs and case management are supposed to make in respect of discovery.
Having said this, Order 24 rules 8 and 15A have been amended and intro-
duced respectively to enhance the courts' control over discovery. Order 24
rule 15A is especially useful in that it enables the court to limit discovery;
specify a particular manner in which discovery should be made; and direct
when inspection of discovered documents should take place.
In respect of the "manners" of discovery, it may be useful to look at the
Commercial Court Guide.92 Part of Section E of the Guide is reproduced at
Figure 8.
For the full text of the Court Guide, see the HM Court Service website at http://www.hmcourts-
service.gov.uk/publications/guidance/admiralcomm/index.htm.
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Figure 8: Admiralty and Commercial Court Guide, Section E
E2 Procedure
E2.1 At the case management conference the court will normally wish
to consider one or more of the following:
(i) ordering standard disclosure: rule 31.5(1);
(ii) dispensing with or limiting standard disclosure: rule 31.5(2);
(iii) ordering sample disclosure;
(iv) ordering disclosure in stages;
(v) ordering disclosure otherwise than by service of a list of docu-
ments, for example, by service of copy documents; and
(vi) ordering specific disclosure: rule 31.12.
Albeit that the English authorities are thin on the application of the
above Commercial Court practice it is suggested that the terms are self-
explanatory and that the Hong Kong courts should exercise a degree of
imagination and, provided the underlying objectives are satisfied, dispense
with the routine paper trail and order limited disclosure - perhaps on liabil-
ity only or on a particular issue - on occasions.
Pre-action discovery
The Ordinance addresses the extension of pre-action discovery by remov-
ing the words "in respect of personal injuries to a person or in respect of a
person's death" from section 41 of the High Court Ordinance so that the
relevant passage reads as set out in Figure 9.93
93 Section 41 is also now divided into two subsections.
Figure 9: Section 41(1)
(1) On the application, in accordance with rules of court, of a person
who appears to the Court of First Instance to be likely to be a party to
subsequent proceedings in that Court in which a claim is likely to be
made, the Court of First Instance shall, in such circumstances as may be
specified in the rules, have power to order a person who appears to the
Court of First Instance to be likely to be a party to the proceedings and
to be likely to have or to have had in his possession, custody or power
any documents which are directly relevant to an issue arising or likely
to arise out of that claim [discovery and inspection of any documents
specified in the order]"
(2008) HKLJ
HeinOnline -- 38 Hong Kong L.J. 122 2008
Vol 38 Part 1 Civil Justice Reform in Hong Kong - Its Progress and its Future 123
RHC Order 24 rule 7A is amended to reflect these changes also.
Yet, although the change is inspired by CPR Part 31.16, there are some
differences between the two provisions. Firstly, within section 41, not only
must the applicant and respondent to the pre-action discovery application
be "likely" parties to a subsequent claim, that claim itself must also be "like-
ly". The word "likely", as far as English proceedings are concerned, means
"may well" rather than "more probable than not"9 4 and it is one which the
Hong Kong courts are familiar with. Having said this, the requirement
that the claim itself is "likely" is not found in the CPR, nor is it found in
the proposed rule for pre-action discovery in the District Court95 and it has
been removed from the latest draft RHC pre-action discovery rules. This
inconsistency needs to be addressed.
Sharp eyed readers would have spotted a new term in section 41. What
does "directly relevant" mean? This is defined in a "new" section 41(2) as
can been seen in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Section 41(2)
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a document is only to be re-
garded as directly relevant to an issue arising or likely to arise out of
a claim in the anticipated proceedings if -
(a) the document would be likely to be relied on in evidence by
any party in the proceedings; or
(b) the document supports or adversely affects any party's case.
Again, RHC Order 24 rule 7A reflects this provision. This is a little wider
than the "standard disclosure" of CPR Part 31.6, given the presence of the
words "likely to arise" and "likely to be relied on". It is worth noting that
pre-action disclosure in the CPR is limited to standard disclosure, the aim
being to prevent "fishing expeditions". Whether it does so of course is down
to the willingness of the courts to apply the rule. In England, all applica-
tions are decided on their own merits and, to reinforce this fact, the Court
of Appeal expressly ruled out laying down guidelines on such applications
in Bermuda International Securities Ltd v KPMG.96
The English courts have therefore tended to take a fairly cautious case-
by-case approach to pre-action discovery. For example, in BSW Ltd v Balltec
94 Black v Sumitomo Corporation [2003] 3 All ER 643.
95 This is one occasion when the District Court's rules have not been ignored.
96 [2001] CPLR 252.
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Ltd,97 the applicant sought pre-action discovery the respondent's design
drawings in relation to equipment for the off-shore oil industry. One of the
applicant's former directors had been involved in the design and manufac-
ture of the equipment concerned and he joined the respondent shortly after
he left the applicant. Within two months of him doing so, the respondent
started to manufacture equipment that was similar to and in direct com-
petition with the applicant's. Naturally, the applicant suspected that its
copyrights had been infringed. The court would not, however, simply follow
a "two and two makes four" approach. It held that the applicant's allega-
tions against the respondent were not based on any direct documentary or
expert evidence. The intended claim was a "speculative" claim and the ap-
plicant would not be permitted access to the respondent's trade secrets (ie
its designs) without a "clear and convincing evidential basis" for its belief
that its copyright had been infringed.
By contrast, in Baron WR Jay and Ors v Wilder Coe (A firm),9 the appli-
cant solicitors firm's bookkeeper had committed fraud against them, which
had not been spotted by the firm's auditors. The respondent auditors had re-
fused to voluntarily discover the relevant audit documents. In this case, the
court held that a CPR Part 31.16 application was justified as the applicants
had suffered and needed the respondent's papers to identify "mechanism"
of their "misfortune". One would hope and expect that, despite the slight
variation in the language of section 41(2) and CPR Part 31.16, the Hong
Kong courts would take an equally pragmatic approach.
Non-party discovery
The Ordinance addresses non-party discovery by simply amending section
42(1) of the High Court Ordinance by removing the words "in respect of
personal injuries to a person or in respect of a person's death". The changes
to RHC Order 24 rule 7A also apply to non-party discovery. As with pre-
action discovery, the English courts have adopted a case-by-case approach
to non-party discovery. For example, in A v X & B (Non-party),99 the
plaintiff suffered from psychological problems after accident for which the
defendant had been found liable. The defendant, when it came to contest
quantum, sought CPR Part 31.17 disclosure of the plaintiff's brother's (a
non-party) medical records in order to demonstrate that the plaintiff's psy-
chological problems were not all due to the accident. The court declined to
make such an order.
One of the more interesting consequences of CPR Part 31.17 has been
the affect on the alternative means of discovery all the same. As already
97 [2006] EWHC 822.
98 [2003] EWHC 1786.
9 [2004] EWHC 447.
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mentioned, CPR Part 31.18 states that CPR Parts 31.16 and 31.17 do not
limit any other power which the courts may have to order pre-action and
non-party discovery. Hence, the Norwich Pharmacal and Khanna v Lovell
White Durrant "fake subpoena" procedures remain, as do the discovery of
documents under Freezing Injunctions (Mareva Injunctions), Search Orders
(Anton Piller Orders) and orders for the inspection of property.100
Readers will be familiar with the principle in Norwich Pharmacal Co v
Commissioners of Customs & Excise 01 that anyone who, however innocent-
ly, becomes "mixed up in the tortious acts of others so as to facilitate their
wrongdoing" is under a duty to assist the person who had been wronged by
giving full information and disclosing the identity of the wrongdoer(s). The
court can, accordingly, order that person to disclose the wrongdoer's iden-
tity so that they may be sued. There is, of course, the important distinction
between a mere witness and a facilitator for the purposes of a Norwich Phar-
macal order. The former cannot be compelled to make any such disclosure.
In Carlton Film Distributors v VDC Ltd102 the court granted an applica-
tion for an order that a third party disclose certain information where the
potential plaintiff knew the potential defendant but required more informa-
tion to plead an allegation of breach of contract. The information sought
went "straight to the heart" of the potential claim and making a Norwich
Pharmacal order "was the fastest, clearest and shortest way of getting there".
Similarly in AOOT Kalmneft v Denton Wilde Sapteo3 it was held that a so-
licitors' files on its client's affairs should be disclosed as Norwich Pharmacal
covered an alleged wrongdoer's identity and any information showing that
he, she or it (the client in this case) had carried out the wrongdoing. It will
be interesting to see if the Hong Kong courts also widen the scope of Nor-
wich Pharmacal after April 2009.
Electronic Discovery
Perhaps the most telling absence in the Interim Report, Final Report, Bill,
Ordinance and RHC is the failure to address the subject of electronic dis-
covery or the discovery of electronic documents.
The definition of a "document" in both England and Wales and Hong
Kong has long been accepted as being broader than mere sheets of paper,
yet CPR Part 31.4 specifically states that a document is "anything in which
information of any description is recorded" thus a "document" includes
audio and video cassettes, DVDs, CDs and electronic documents such as
emails, messages on mobile telephones, word-processed documents and
.oo These are all now covered by CPR Part 25 and its accompanying Practice Directions.
101 [1974] AC 133.
10z (2003) EWHC 616.
103 [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep 417.
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databases. There is no such provision in the RHC, instead faith is placed in
the case law which CPR Part 31.4 codifies. Moreover, Practice Direction 31
paragraph 2A.1 of the CPR provides that the definition covers documents
"that are stored on servers and back-up systems and electronic documents
that have been 'deleted"'. It also extends to additional information stored
and associated with electronic documents known as metadata. Again, the
RHC is silent.
As to how to deal with the discovery of electronic documents, Practice
Direction 31 paragraph 2A.2 states that "The parties should, prior to the
first CMC, discuss any issues that may arise regarding searches for and the
preservation of electronic documents". This discussion should be wide-
ranging and cover, among other things, the "categories of electronic docu-
ments within their control, the computer systems, electronic devices and
media on which any relevant documents may be held". Paragraph 2A.3
adds that this cooperation is to extend to the "format in which electronic
copy documents are to be provided on inspection". Any "difficulty or dis-
agreement" should be referred to a judge for directions at, if possible, the
CMC.
Practice Direction 31 paragraph 2A.4 covers the fact that the existence
of electronic documents will affect the extent of the reasonable search
required by CPR Part 31.7. A number of factors may be relevant when
deciding the reasonableness of a search for electronic documents includ-
ing the number involved; the ease and expense of their retrieval; and the
significance of any document which is likely to be found. Finally Practice
Direction 31 paragraph 2A.5 recognises that it may be reasonable to search
some or all of the parties' electronic storage systems depending on the cir-
cumstances. The courts are therefore given the discretion to determine
what may be appropriate.
The English courts have once again taken a pragmatic approach. In
Hands v Morrison Construction Services Ltdjo 4 the applicant sought the
pre-action discovery of certain documents relating to the design and
construction of an oval circuit suitable for staging car races. The respon-
dent argued that this request covered electronic documents which were
the equivalent to 850,000 lever arch files and 550 physical files of docu-
ments. The court ordered the discovery of the hard copy documents in the
respondent's solicitor's possession only. By contrast, in Chantrey Vellacott v
The Convergence Group Plc1o5 the court ordered the specific discovery of six
years' worth of e-mails between several individuals in relation to a failed
multi-million dollar telecoms project.
104 [2006] EWHC 2018.
1os [2006] EWHC 490.
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It strongly recommended that the literature on electronic disclosure and
those practitioners familiar with its complexities be consulted in advance of
the finalisation of the RHC. The fruits of such consultation should then be
included in the RHC. Not to do so would be to lay traps for the future."o'
The Fate of Civil Justice Reform
The Civil Justice Reforms are still over a year from being implemented
and the final forms of the "new" RHC and RDC are not yet settled. It is
to be hoped that the drafting errors in the CPR, some of which have been
addressed in this article, will be noted and amendments made to the draft
RHC in light of the same. The success or failure of the process will not,
however, rest merely on the contents of the Ordinance and RHC.
The success of the CPR has not been due to what is contained in the
several thousand pages of the White Book but due to the attitudes of the
courts, practitioners and parties. The introduction of the CPR coincided
with a notable shift away from the adversarial attitude of the past. How
deep this shift has been and whether it was a consequence or the cause of
the CPR remain subjects of debate, but there has been a shift nonetheless.
The most prominent sign of this shift has been the growth in mediation.
Again, some observers claim that mediation has grown as a consequence of
the cuts in civil Legal Aid and the rising cost of lawyers.' 07 Nevertheless,
Churchill's old adage that "Jaw, jaw" is better than "War, war" appears to
have been taken to heart.
A similar shift will be needed if the limited changes embodied by the
Ordinance and new RHC are to succeed. Thus far, there appears to be little
sign of such a shift. The responses to the Working Party's reports reveal a
strong resistance to any form of meaningful reform, despite the almost uni-
versal recognition that the current system is not providing litigants with
what they need. Calls for "evolutionary" change are siren calls.
A change will be required from the courts and the authorities too. The
CPR were far less successful than they could have been because of a re-
luctance of the UK government to invest in training and resources. Lord
Woolf himself called for up-to-date IT systems for the courts in his "Access
to Justice" reports over 10 years ago, yet there are still courts today that
1o6 The UK Commercial Litigator's Forum was an early advocate for rules to deal with electronic
disclosure. Its discussion paper can be found on its website: http://www.commerciallitigatorsforum.
com.
107 Lightman J's speech at the SJ Berwin Mediation Summer Drinks Reception of 28 June 2007 is
especially critical of the UK government's treatment of civil legal aid. A copy of the speech is
available on the ADR Group's website: http://www.adrgroup.co.uk.
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lack adequate stationery, let alone have integrated e-mail communications
with each other or the outside world. Both the judiciary and practitioners
will need retraining in the new rules. Again, in England, some courts and
firms were found lacking, which explains some of the confusion of the early
decisions on the CPR. Similar mistakes can and must be avoided in Hong
Kong.
Finally, the implementation of the Ordinance and RHC should not be
seen to be the end of the reform process. Whilst it is irksome that the UK
authorities have issued 46 updates to the CPR, it reflects a recognition
that the court system should be subject to constant review and - if need
be - reform. The Civil Justice Council"o' was established under the Civil
Procedure Act 1997 "with responsibility for overseeing and coordinating
the modernisation of the civil justice system". Its role is therefore distinct
from that of the Law Commission. Its membership is comprised from the
judiciary, legal profession, civil servants concerned with the administration
of the courts, consumer affairs experts, lay advisors and representatives of
certain business sectors eg insurers. It has conducted a great deal of work
since its creation, not least in the field of ADR, and many of its reports and
recommendations have been implemented.
The Civil Justice Council has proved to be an effective "watchdog" for
reform. It is to be hoped that the Department of Justice will give a home to
a similar pet.
"0 The CJC website: http://www.civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk.
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